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1. Introduction
Random numbers have an important role in several fields such Monte Carlo
methods, genetic algorithms, design of VLSI circuits, cryptographic systems,
etc. (see Niederreiter [17] and the references therein). There mainly exist two
methods for generating random numbers: by hardware and by software. In
general, the first method is based on physical phenomena; whereas the second
one is based on an algorithm (c.f. Goldreich et al. [4], Lagarias [9], and Micali
et al. [14]). One of the characteristics of the second method is that the same
sequence is obtained each time the same parameter of the algorithm is used.
For this reason these sequences are called pseudorandom. Using deterministic
algorithms is more easy and computationally cheaper; hence, more attractive.
Moreover, in most cases, one only needs to guarantee that the algorithm has
good random properties as number generator, i.e., the obtained sequences seem
to be random and have large period. Nevertheless, these properties are not
sufficient in cryptography, for example.
As it is known, the main goal of cryptography is to assure the secrecy and
confidentiality of communications among users, who interchange information
by an insecure channel (c.f. Menezes et al. [13] and Mollin [15]). Opposite, the
goal of cryptanalysis is to break this secrecy and confidentiality. Pseudorandom
bit generators are used to encrypt a plaintext by using a stream cipher. In this
situation, the binary sequence defined by the plaintext is added, bit by bit, with
the bit sequence generated by the pseudorandom bit generator. The secret key
is the seed used in the generator to produce the sequence. Hence, good random
properties of the generator are convenient to prevent statistical attacks, but
moreover, it is necessary that the generator must be sure. The security, in
this sense, means that the probability that an algorithm can produce in a
polynomial time the next bit of a given sequence, is negligible.
In this paper, we are interested in the use of cellular automata as pseudo-
random bit generators in relation to their cryptographic properties. Hence, we
will study their pseudorandom properties as well as their cryptographic secu-
rity. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In §2 we recall some of the
most used pseudorandom number generators and the definition of the linear
complexity of a sequence. The definition and properties of cellular automata,
and in particular Wolfram cellular automata, are reviewed in §3. In section
§4 we present several statistical tests to determine the goodness of the pseu-
dorandom bit generators. Later, a classification of Wolfram cellular automata
according to their behavior in relation to these tests is determined in §5. A
cryptanalytic attack against several classes of Wolfram cellular automata is
analyzed in §6. Finally, the conclusions are presented in §7.
2. Pseudorandom number generators and linear complexity
There are many pseudorandom generators (PRG) and a general review of
them is presented in Knuth [8, Chapter 3]. Among them, the more extended
due to their good random properties, long periods, easy implementation and
computational efficiency, are the following:
1. Linear congruential generators : They are based on the formula
xi+1 ≡ axi + b (mod m) , i ≥ 0,
where a is the multiplier, b is a constant, m is the modulus, and x0 is
the seed.
2. Fibonacci generators : This class of generators are defined by the formula:
xi+1 ≡ (xi−j ∗ xi−k) , i ≥ min (j, k) ,
where ∗ stands for some of the following binary operators: +, −, ·, /, or
⊕ (XOR).
3. Linear feedback shift register (LFSR): A linear feedback shift register of
length L consists of L stages, 0, 1, . . . , L − 1, each of them can store
one bit and have one input and one output (see Golomb [5]). A clock
controls the movement of data and during each unit of time the following
operations are performed: (a) The content of stage 0 is output and forms
part of the output sequence; (b) the content of stage i is moved to stage
i − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1; and (c) the content of stage L − 1 is the feedback
bit. The output of a sequence is determined by the following recursive
expression:
si+1 ≡ (a1si−1 + a2si−2 + . . . + aLsi−L) (mod 2) ,
where ai ∈ Z2, 1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1, and aL = 1. If the initial content of
stage i is si ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1, then [sL−1, . . . , s1, s0] is called the
initial state of the LFSR. It is said that a LFSR generates a sequence s
(finite or infinite) if there exists some initial state for which the output
sequence of the LFSR is s.
The linear complexity of a bit sequence s is defined as the length of the
shortest LFSR that generates the given sequence, and it is denoted by L(s). If
Li, i ≥ 1, is the linear complexity of the finite subsequence si = s1, s2, . . . , si,
of the sequence s, then the sequence L1, L2, . . . is called the linear complexity
profile of s. This sequence can be plotted by representing the points (i, Li),
i ≥ 1, and joining them by horizontal and vertical segments. It is clear that
the graph of a linear complexity profile is not decreasing and that the expected
linear complexity of a random sequence should be closely follow the line L =
i/2. The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm (c.f. Menezes et al. [13, §6.2.3]) is an
efficient algorithm to determine the linear complexity of a finite sequence of
length n.
Remark that, as in the case of statistical tests for pseudorandomness, for
a sequence to have a linear complexity profile closely to that of a random
sequence, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be considered as ran-
dom. For example, linear congruential generators pass the statistical tests of
pseudorandomness (see Menezes et al. [13, §5.4.4]), but it has been proved (see
Lagarias et al. [10] and Plumstead [19]) that these generators are predictable.
These results are still true if only the sequence of the less significant bits of xi,
i ≥ 1, is known (see Boyar [1, 2]). For these reasons, linear generators are not
suitable to be use in cryptography.
In the last years, generators defined by polynomials recurrences of the form
xi+1 ≡ f (xi) (mod m), i ≥ 0, where f(x) is a polynomial function, have been
studied. In this way, the properties of their multidimensional distribution are
studied in Gutierrez et al. [7] and Shparlinski [20]. Moreover, number gener-
ators based on the difficulty of mathematical and computational problems, as
the discrete logarithm problem, are proposed (see Genaro [3]).
3. Linear finite cellular automata as pseudorandom bit generators
Cellular automata –CA for short– are discrete dynamical systems formed
by a finite or infinite number of identical objects called cells. These cells are
endowed with a state which changes at every discrete step of time according to
a deterministic rule. The most used CA are finite and linear. More precisely,
they can be defined as a 4-uplet A = (C, S, V, f), where C is the cellular space,
which is a linear array of m cells. Each cell is denoted by 〈i〉, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
S is the finite state set, that is, it is the set of all possible values of the cells.
In general is taken S = Zk. The set of indices of C is the ordered finite set
V ⊂ Z, such that for every cell 〈i〉 ∈ C, its neighborhood V〈i〉 is the ordered
set of m cells given by
V〈i〉 = {〈i + α1〉 , . . . , 〈i + αm〉 : αi ∈ V } .
The most used neighborhoods are symmetric in the sense that the cell 〈i〉 is the
central cell of the set V〈i〉, and in this case, the radius is the value r = (m−1)/2.
Moreover, the local transition function f : Sm → S is the function deter-
mining the evolution of the CA throughout the time, i.e., the changes of the
states of every cell taking the states of its neighbors into account. Hence, if
a
(t)
i ∈ S stands for the state of the cell 〈i〉 at time t, its next state is given by
the following expression:
a
(t+1)
i = f(a
(t)
i+α1
, . . . , a
(t)
i+αm
).
If the neighborhood is symmetric of radius r, this expression becomes
a
(t+1)
i = f
(
a
(t)
i−r, . . . , a
(t)
i , . . . , a
(t)
i+r
)
. (1)
The set of states of all cells in a time t is called the configuration at time
t and it is represented by the vector:
C(t) =
(
a
(t)
0 , a
(t)
1 , . . . , a
(t)
n−1
)
∈ S × (n. . .× S.
In particular, C(0) is the initial configuration. Finally, as the cellular space
is finite, boundary conditions must be established in order to assure that the
evolution of the cellular automata is well-defined.
An interesting property of the CA is to be left-toggle, right-toggle or both.
A CA is left-toggle if the equation (1) holds and it is verified that
1− a(t+1)i = f(1− a(t)i−r, . . . , a(t)i , . . . , a(t)i+r). (2)
In a similar way, a CA is right-toggle if the equation (1) holds and it verifies
1− a(t+1)i = f(a(t)i−r, . . . , a(t)i , . . . , 1− a(t)i+r). (3)
In the particular case of Wolfram cellular automata –WCA for short–, the
state set is S = Z2 (see Wolfram [23]), the neighborhoods are symmetric of
radius r = 1, hence V = {−1, 0, 1}, the transition rule is given by the formula
a
(t+1)
i = f(a
(t)
i−1, a
(t)
i , a
(t)
i+1), (4)
and the boundary conditions are defined by:
a
(t)
i = a
(t)
j ⇔ i ≡ j mod (n− 1) .
As for WCA is |S| = 2 and |V | = 3, there are 28 different values for the rule
f : S3 → S, say f(0, 0, 0) = f0, f(0, 0, 1) = f1, f(0, 1, 0) = f2, f(0, 1, 1) = f3,
f(1, 0, 0) = f4, f(1, 0, 1) = f5, f(1, 1, 0) = f6, and f(1, 1, 1) = f7. Hence, it is
possible to assign a unique value w, 0 ≤ w ≤ 255, to each Wolfram cellular
automaton WCA(w), such that this value will be the number of the CA. The
number is determined by the following formula
w =
7∑
i=0
2ifi.
For example, if f0 = f5 = f6 = f7 = 0, and f1 = f2 = f3 = f4 = 1, we have
w = 30, whose expression is any of the following:
a
(t+1)
i =
(
a
(t)
i−1 + a
(t)
i + a
(t)
i+1 + a
(t)
i · a(t)i+1
)
(mod 2) (5)
= a
(t)
i−1 XOR
(
a
(t)
i OR a
(t)
i+1
)
.
In section §2 we have presented some of the most important PRG. Here, we
consider the use of WCA as pseudorandom bit generators (PRBG). WCA(30)
was the first WCA proposed as a PRBG by Wolfram [24], and from then, many
other works have studied the problem of generating numbers in a pseudoran-
dom way by using CA (c.f. de la Gu´ıa et al. [6], Nandi et al. [16], Tomassini
et al. [21], and Tomassini et al. [22]).
Here we are interested in the use of WCA as PRBG from the point of view
of cryptography. A process to obtain a bit sequence by using a WCA is to
consider an initial configuration of n cells of the WCA, C (0), and to iterate
it k times. As the state set is S = Z2, after determining the evolution of
this WCA, k configurations of n bits are obtained, C (i) =
(
a
(i)
0 , . . . , a
(i)
n−1
)
,
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Hence, by linking together the configurations, a bit sequence of
k · n bits is obtained:
s = a
(1)
0 , . . . , a
(1)
n−1, a
(2)
0 , . . . , a
(2)
n−1, . . . , a
(k)
0 , . . . , a
(k)
n−1.
Nevertheless, knowing the whole evolution of a WCA is a weakness for its cryp-
tographic use. Hence, it is necessary to determine a bit sequence by a different
process. For example, one can consider the time evolution of the central cell.
In this way, after iterating k times the WCA whose initial configuration has
2n + 1 cells, a sequence of k bits is obtained:
s = a(1)n , a
(2)
n , . . . , a
(k)
n .
This process is more expensive than the previous one, but it is safer for cryp-
tographic purposes, because only one bit of each time iteration is known.
4. Statistical tests for pseudorandomness
To assure good pseudorandom properties of a bit sequence, it has to pass
several statistical tests. There are many tests designed for this purpose (see
Knuth [8, Chapter 3], Marsaglia [11], and Niederreiter [18, Chapter 7]). Never-
theless, we will use the five basic tests proposed by Menezes et al. [13, §5.4.4].
These tests have been developed ad hoc for cryptographic use and they are
based on Golomb’s randomness postulates (see Golomb [5]).
The frequency test has the purpose of determining whether the number of
0’s and 1’s in the sequence s = s0, . . . , sn−1 are approximately the same, as it is
expected for a truly random sequence. If n0, n1 denotes the number of 0’s and
1’s in s, respectively, the statistic considered (which follows a χ2 distribution
with 1 degree of freedom if n ≥ 10) is:
Xf =
(n0 − n1)2
n
.
The serial test tries to determine if the number of pairs 00, 01, 10, and 11 in
s, are approximately the same. If n00, n01, n10, and n11 are, respectively, the
number of such occurrences, the statistic used (which follows a χ2 distribution
with 2 degrees of freedom if n ≥ 21) is:
Xs =
4
n− 1
(
n200 + n
2
01 + n
2
10 + n
2
11
)− 2
n
(
n20 + n
2
1
)
+ 1.
Let m be an integer such that bn/mc ≥ 5 · 2m and let k = n/m. In the poker
test the sequence s is divided into k non-overlapping parts of length m. Let ni
be the number of occurrences of the ith type of sequences of length m, such
that each of them appears the same number of times in s. Then, the statistic
considered (which follows a χ2 distribution with 2m− 1 degrees of freedom) is:
Xp =
2m
k
(
2m∑
i=1
n2i
)
− k.
A gap (resp. a block) of a sequence is a subsequence of s consisting of 0’s
(resp. 1’s) between 1’s (resp. 0’s). Gaps and blocks are called runs. As
the expected number of runs of length i in a random sequence of length n is
ei = (n− i + 3)/2i+2, the purpose of the runs test is to check if the number of
runs of several lengths in s is as expected in a random sequence. Let k be the
largest integer i for which ei ≥ 5 and let Gi and Bi the number of gaps and
blocks of length i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The statistic used for this test (which
follows a χ2 distribution with 2k − 2 degrees of freedom) is:
Xr =
k∑
i=1
(Gi − ei)2
ei
+
k∑
i=1
(Bi − ei)2
ei
.
The autocorrelation test determines the correlations between the sequence s
and non-cyclic shifted versions of s. Let d be an integer such that 1 ≤ d ≤
bn/2c. The number of bits in s not equal to their d-shifts is given by
A(d) =
n−d−1∑
i=0
si ⊕ si+d.
The statistic used (which follows a N(0, 1) distribution if n − d ≥ 10) is the
following:
Xa = 2
A(d)− n−d
2√
n− d .
5. Pseudorandomness classification of Wolfram cellular automata
In this section we present the behavior of all WCA with relation to the
statistical test presented in §4 and their linear complexity. In relation to the
pseudorandom tests, we have considered four sieves such that in each of them,
100 sequences for each WCA studied have been generated. The significance
level considered for each test has been α = 0.05 and we have rejected a WCA
if the number of sequences which do not pass any of the tests is bigger than
20%.
In the first sieve all the 256 WCA have been studied and for each of them we
have analyzed 100 different sequences. The length of the initial configuration
of each WCA was of 300 cells and they have been iterated 1000 times. Hence,
each bit sequence has a length k = 1000. Only 24 of the all 256 WCA have
pass this sieve and they are shown in Table 1.
WCA number Xf Xs Xp Xr Xa
30 4 5 4 6 8
45 9 3 9 7 3
60 8 5 10 11 6
75 5 8 5 9 8
86 3 6 6 7 6
89 1 3 2 6 6
90 4 6 5 7 5
101 5 5 5 6 5
102 6 4 1 6 1
105 3 0 3 4 5
106 7 8 7 7 7
120 4 3 5 11 5
122 4 4 2 6 4
126 7 6 7 3 11
129 6 5 6 6 5
135 8 8 5 5 1
149 8 7 7 6 1
150 4 3 12 7 4
153 6 5 8 10 7
161 5 6 8 12 6
165 8 7 4 12 7
169 8 7 3 5 3
195 3 3 7 11 5
225 7 5 5 6 7
Table 1. % of rejected sequences for the WCA which have passed the first
sieve
In the second sieve only the remaining 24 WCA have been studied. For
this occasion, the length of each initial configuration was of 500 cells and each
of the 100 sequences for each WCA have been iterated 2500 times. After this
study, only the WCA(126) did not pass this sieve. The third sieve was similar
to the previous ones. In this case the length of each sequence was of 5000 bits
and only the WCA(129) did not pass the sieve. Hence, only rest 22 WCA in
the study. For the fourth sieve the number of bits of each sequence for the
rest of the WCA was of 10000. Again, only one WCA did not pass this fourth
sieve, the given by the number 122. After to perform the fourth sieve, the
results obtained for the remaining WCA are shown in Table 2. Hence, we can
conclude that only 21 WCA have pass the five pseudorandom tests considered.
WCA number Xf Xs Xp Xr Xa
30 7 3 6 3 5
45 2 6 3 12 9
60 3 6 6 6 5
75 9 5 5 3 4
86 5 5 4 6 8
89 5 4 6 4 2
90 4 2 6 6 4
101 5 5 3 7 8
102 4 5 8 4 6
105 7 9 7 4 2
106 5 3 6 8 3
120 3 3 3 2 6
135 8 5 6 4 3
149 2 5 2 1 6
150 6 14 6 11 8
153 6 5 8 10 7
161 10 6 10 4 8
165 4 4 4 7 7
169 6 6 6 10 4
195 5 7 8 4 2
225 4 6 5 10 5
Table 2. % of rejected sequences for the WCA which have passed the fourth
sieve
After this analysis, we have studied the linear complexity of each WCA
survivor in order to guarantee another necessary condition of pseudorandom-
ness as it was mentioned in §2. In this way, we have determined the linear
complexity for several sequences of k = 10000 bits for each WCA and these
results are shown in Table 3.
WCA number Interval of the linear complexity
30 4998− 5002
45 4999− 5002
60 992− 1000
75 5000− 5002
86 5001
89 5001− 5002
90 496
101 5001
102 992− 1000
105 498
106 5000− 5001
120 4999− 5001
135 5000
149 5000
150 494
153 993− 1000
161 2616− 2895
165 497
169 4999− 5000
195 993− 1000
225 4999− 5000
Table 3. Linear complexity of the WCA survivor
The linear complexity profiles of two extreme cases in Table 2 –numbers
30 and 150– are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
After this study, we conclude that the only WCA with good pseudoran-
dom properties and linear complexity close to the line k/2 are those given by
following numbers:
30, 45, 75, 86, 89, 101, 106, 120, 135, 149, 169, 225.
Note that the WCA of numbers 30, 45, 75, 120, 135, and 225 are left-toggle,
whereas the WCA of numbers 86, 89, 101, 106, 149, and 169 are right-toggle.
Hence, from formulas (2) (resp. (3)) and (4) it is possible to obtain a
(t)
i−1 (resp.
a
(t)
i+1) as a function of a
(t)
i , a
(t+1)
i , and a
(t)
i+1 (resp. a
(t)
i , a
(t+1)
i , and a
(t)
i−1).
Figure 1: Linear complexity profile of WCA(30)
Figure 2: Linear complexity profile of WCA(150)
6. Cryptanalytic attack
Meier and Staffelbach [12] presented an attack to the sequences generated
by WCA(30), which is successful if the length of the secret key (the initial
configuration of the CA) is n < 500 bits and it is based on the transition
function of WCA(30). From formula (5) it is possible to obtain the value of
a
(t)
i−1 as a linear function of the values of a
(t)
i , a
(t+1)
i , and a
(t)
i+1, that is,
a
(t)
i−1 =
(
a
(t+1)
i + a
(t)
i + a
(t)
i+1 + a
(t)
i · a(t)i+1
)
(mod 2). (6)
Hence, from n consecutive values of the cell 〈i〉, and n− 1 consecutive values
of its adjacent cell 〈i + 1〉, it is possible to obtain n − 1 values of its another
adjacent cell 〈i− 1〉. If the values of the cell 〈i + 1〉 are known for each time;
it is possible to recover the whole evolution of the WCA from formula (6);
and, in particular, the initial configuration; i.e., the secret key. Hence, to
know the evolution of the cell 〈i + 1〉 is equivalent to know the key. This
attack permits to obtain the secret key of length 2n − 1 if n bits of the key
stream sequence are known. This algorithm supposes that the evolution of
the central cell is given; that is, the n values a
(t+k)
i , k = 0, . . . , n − 1, are
known. Then n − 1 random values for a(t)i+j, j = 1, . . . , n − 1, are generated.
From these values, it is possible to determine the values of all cells forming
the right triangle of the configuration of the WCA considered, i.e., the values
of the cells a
(t+k)
i+j , where j = 1, . . . , n − k, and k = 1, . . . , n − 1. Later the
values of the cells forming the left triangle of the evolution of the WCA are
computed: a
(t+k)
i−j , with k = 0, . . . , n − j, and j = 1, . . . , n − 1. In this way,
an initial configuration of the WCA is obtained, and hence, a secret key that
generates the same evolution of the central cell 〈i〉. Note that probably the
whole evolution of the WCA is not the same that the initial evolution of the
WCA because the initial configurations can be different, but in both cases, the
evolution of the central cell is the same.
Due to the fact that all the WCA which have passed the statistical tests
and have good linear complexity, are left-toggle or right-toggle, we have studied
the algorithm defined for WCA(30) in order to apply it for the rest of WCA.
In fact the attack can be extended to any left-toggle WCA because for all of
them one can recover the value of the cell 〈i− 1〉 at time t from the values of
the cells 〈i〉 and 〈i + 1〉 at the same time and the value of the cell 〈i〉 at time
t+1. Moreover, for the right-toggle WCA we have implemented an algorithm,
similar to the previous one for left-toggle, from which it is possible to attack
successfully these WCA. The algorithm for both class of WCA can be resumed
as follows:
Input: A bit sequence of length n, s = s0, s1, . . . , sn−1, and the number w of
the left-toggle or right-toggle WCA.
Output: The initial configuration of the WCA of length 2n− 1.
1. Compute the transition function of WCA(w):
a
(t+1)
i = f(a
(t)
i−1, a
(t)
i , a
(t)
i+1)
2. If WCA(w) is left-toggle t← −1 else t← 1
3. Compute the function a
(t)
i+t ← F (a(t+1)i , a(t)i , a(t)i−t) from the formula:
a
(t+1)
i = f(a
(t)
i−1, a
(t)
i , a
(t)
i+1)
4. For j from 0 to n− 1 do ajn ← sj
5. For j from 1 to n− 1 do a0n−t·j ← rand(0..1)
6. For k from 1 to n− 2 do
For j from 1 to n− 1− k do
akn−t·j ← F
(
ak−1n−t·j−1, a
k−1
n−t·j , a
k−1
n−t·j+1
)
7. For j from 1 to n− 1 do
For k from n− 1− j by −1 to 0 do
akn+t·j ← F
(
ak+1
n+t(j−1), a
k
n+t(j−1), a
k
n+t(j−2)
)
8. Return
(
a01, a
0
2, . . . , a
0
2n−1
)
In this way, we have proved that it is possible to determine the initial
configuration of the WCA considered, i.e., the secret key used for generating
the bit sequence. Hence WCA are not suitable to be used as pseudorandom
bit generators in cryptography, and their use must be restricted to others
applications.
7. Conclusions
We have studied all the 256 Wolfram cellular automata for their use in
cryptography as pseudorandom bit generators. To do this, we have analyzed
their pseudorandom properties by means of several statistical tests with cryp-
tographic significance, and we have determined their linear complexity. From
the results obtained, we have considered only 12 WCA with good pseudo-
random properties and high linear complexity. For these WCA, which are
left-toggle or right-toggle, we have implemented an efficient algorithm which
computes the initial configuration of the WCA considered, and we conclude
that none WCA must be used for cryptographic purposes. Hence, the future
work consists in studying if hybrid or non-uniform cellular automata (their
local transition function is not the same for all cells) are suitable for their use
in cryptography.
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